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THE CORPORATION AS A TECHNIQUE OF
INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION*
SiGmuND TnoERaotT HE MOST DYNAMIC AND SERVICEABLE CONCEPT in the portfolio of
modem business, the idea of the corporation, traces its lineage di-
rectly back to a great thirteenth century canonist, Pope Innocent
IV. During an incubation period of four centuries, the corporate concept
was in large measure the handmaiden of institutionalized religion.' It was
the legal device whereby a small collective enterprise devoted to God,
learning or charity, such as an abbey or university, could preserve its
continued existence, its legal rights, and its properties, even though the
original human members of the group enterprise had all died.
In the seventeenth century, a new and more ambitious field was carved
out for corporate action. The economic exploitation of the wealth to be
found in the new hemisphere of the Americas and the old continent of
Asia became the province of compact and aggressive groups of merchant
adventurers collectively organized as an English (or Dutch, or Portu-
guese) East India (or a Hudson Bay, or a Muscovy) Company. These
companies, in addition to their monopoly privileges and (shall we say
sovereign?) immunities from import and export laws and customs duties,
had the power to tax their own members, decide their own disputes, and
defend themselves against pirates and other external enemies. The Eng-
lish East India Company, it may be noted, not only remained on to sub-
sidize Charles Lamb, John Stuart Mill, and a number of great Orientalists,
but ruled India with an iron grip until the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury.2 In fact, the maintenance of fortifications and consular agents and
* This article represents a considerable expansion of a paper prepared for the Eleventh Con-
ference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion, which took place from September 5th to 8th,
1950. The original paper has just appeared as part of Bryson, Finkelstein, Lasswell and
MacIver, Foundations of World Government: A Political and Cultural Appraisal (1952).
The views herein expressed are, of course, personal to the author, and are not intended to
reflect any governmental or official policies.
t United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs.
I See Goebel, Cases and Materials on the Development of Legal Institutions 547 et seq.
(1937); Maitland, The Corporation Sole, 16 L.Q. Rev. 335 (1900), reprinted in Maitland,
Selected Essays 73-103 (Hazeltine, Lapsley and Winfield ed., 1936); Dewey, The Historic
Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale L.J. 655 (1926). Cf. Figgis, Churches in
the Modern State (1914).
2James Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill, wrote, on company time, a voluminous His-
tory of British India (1840-48), which is largely a history of the East India Company. It is
739
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVEW
the governmental functions of these trading companies justified their
existence even after their economic functions had terminated. 3
Since that time, the corporate concept has embarked on its third and
most inclusive phase. It is no longer the special vehicle for difficult eco-
nomic undertakings of major public importance. It has become the gen-
erally accepted method of conducting all private business enterprises. In
fact, it has, in recent years, in the form of government corporations and
authorities, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation (and its various special purpose subsidiaries), and
regional and local port and transportation authorities, been handling
more and more of this country's governmental business undertakings.
On the international front, private business has taken full advantage of
this third metamorphosis of the corporate concept. The Hudson Bay and
East India trading companies of Elizabethan and Georgian times have
been replaced by modern international combines such as N.V. Phillips,
Unilever, and International Telephone and Telegraph. On the other hand,
national governments have made almost no use of the corporate device in
their handling of affairs that call for multi-national action and coopera-
tion. 4 Effective use of the corporate instrumentality has clearly been a
source of strength to the private international combine. Perhaps greater
use of it as a medium for international cooperation will serve to counter-
act, and put sterner administrative fibre into, the disorganized way in
which the countries of this world are grappling with international econom-
ic affairs.
Furthermore, failure to use the corporate device places national govern-
ments at numerous and decided disadvantages in dealing with private in-
ternational combines. Both in the past and in the present, the organized
pursuit of God and the organized pursuit of private gain have had one
thing in common; they were free of hampering territorial limitations. A
similar freedom from the confinement of geographic boundary lines is not
true, however, of the organized pursuit of personal and political security,
interesting to note how much of this History is devoted to dynastic and other political in-
volvements and how little to economic information. For a short account of the outstanding
contribution made by East India Company administrators to linguistic research, see Arberry,
British Orientalists (1943).
3 See 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law 200 et seq. (1937).
4 Government corporations have been effectively used by individual national governments
to carry out their own international programs, as witness our own Export-Import Bank (in its
financing of international loans), the United States Commercial Company (with its wartime




responsibility for which is currently centered in the national state. Both
the Papacy, now as in the thirteenth century, and a modern international
business combine, together with the spiritual and business affairs confided
to their respective ministrations, are integrated globally whereas the na-
tional government and its affairs are integrated only up to the national
boundary lines. Any objective that a nation wishes to pursue beyond its
territorial borders, such as a tariff or customs accommodation, involves
either a dash, a negotiation, or a concordat with other sovereign powers.
On the other hand, if the management of an international combine in
country A desires a branch or subsidiary in country B to open a new fac-
tory or change the design of a product, written correspondence, oral in-
structions, or at the most a stockholder vote, will serve to translate the
desire into effective corporate action, at least to the extent that any coun-
try adheres to the "liberal" theory with respect to foreign corporations.5
Contrasted with the cohesion of business and spiritual units, the organ-
ized pursuit of peace and political security is still an internationally splin-
tered affair, based on the teetering and momentary equilibria of jarring
national policies and aspirations. The questions raised by this article are:
Can the corporate concept, which has had demonstrable utility in stabiliz-
ing and internationalizing religion and the day-to-day conduct of business,
promote the continuity of international political organization? Can it help
accomplish the integration of the international political community? Can
it be a democratic and acceptable vehicle for the relief of international
tension and strife?
Before attempting an answer to these questions, however, it seems de-
sirable to protest and discard the sterile distinction, first drawn in the sec-
ond half of the nineteenth century, between politics and economics. For
Adam Smith as for Aristotle, political economy had been a philosophically
unified discipline; the individual, the household, and the state all had their
respective roles in the creation and distribution of wealth. With the devel-
6 The international combine must, of course, follow national policies with respect to the
use of local labor, the employment of local capital, the export of dividends, and the like-when
the national government is minded to impose such policies. Furthermore, there are difficul-
ties in the way of a single government enforcing its policies against an international combine,
difficulties which will be apparent to anyone familiar with the failure of state "blue sky"
legislation to cope with fraud in the interstate distribution of corporate securities and of state
antitrust laws to stem the national tide of industrial monopoly. Until adequate international
instruments for the control of international business units are found, national policies with
respect to such units are bound to be frustrated, and the substance of sovereignty in the eco-
nomic sphere will be with the private corporation, not the State. The legal, economic, and
administrative reasons underlying this inability of national states to cope with international
combines are set forth in considerable detail in the author's International Combines and Na-
tional Sovereigns: A Study in Conflict of Laws and Mechanisms, 95 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 575
(1947).
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opment of laissez-faire economic philosophy, designed to eliminate or
minimize the state's role in the wealth-creation and distribution process,
and a growing trend toward intellectual specialization and curricular dis-
integration, political science and economics were cloven asunder. Political
analysis was deprived of its material substratum, the economic activities
and motives which consume the bulk of the time and energies of most citi-
zens of the political state. Economic description was stripped of the state-
ment of ends, final causes, and values that constitute the raison d'gtre of
political, as of ethical, analysis.6 In these days of state economic regula-
tion, state socialism, and state trading, the attempted intellectual divorce
between politics and economics, never at any time put into practice, is es-
pecially incongruous.
England, Holland, and the other great trading powers of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries were delegating political power to their
foreign merchants, when they permitted those merchants to engage-col-
lectively and under the corporate aegis-in foreign trade. In Maitland's
classic phrase, there were "the companies that became colonies, the com-
panies that make war. ' 7 The same proposition holds for the modern large
corporation. The modern state undeniably delegates political power to
large private corporations, as it does to the large labor unions with which
the corporate behemoths deal. 8 The authorization of collective activity
has, at least since the time the early Christian and Jewish communities
had their difficulties with the Roman Emperors, always been a state pre-
rogative. Furthermore, the activities authorized for a large corporation in-
volve such functions as price-fixing, the division of markets, the setting of
wages, and the general development of local communities, functions which
in a pre-Industrial Revolution era had been the primary responsibility of
the State. It has been said of international cartels that some of the more
powerful of them "are little empires in themselves, and-their decisions
are often more important than those of 'sovereign, political' entities like
Holland, Denmark or Portugal."9 The same could be said even more
forcefully of the political strength of that more cohesive unit, the interna-
6 An exception to this generalization should be made for the so-called "institutionalist,
school, e.g., John R. Commons, Thorstein Veblen and Walton Hamilton.
7 Maitland, Introduction to, and Translation of, Gierke's Political Theory of the Middle
Age, XXVII (1900).
8 A collective bargaining representative "is clothed with power not unlike that of a legis-
lature." Chief justice Stone in Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944). See
also ibid., 202-203.
9 Wild, Sanctions of International Commodity Agreements, 30 Am. J. Int. L. 664, 665
(1936). See also Edwards, Economic and Political Aspects of International Cartels (1944);
Hamilton, Cartels, Patents and Politics, 23 Foreign Affairs 582 (1945).
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tional combine; the notion that international combines and cartels are
strong political entities is no longer a monopoly of the intuitively minded
economist or political scientist. judges have described international car-
tels as instruments of "private regulation,"'1 and have called an American
subsidiary the "commercial legation" of its British parent." Even the
counsel involved in drafting international cartel agreements speak of a
trade area as "so-called neutral territory, or to put it another way as
'spoils' belonging to the British and ourselves as allies in the late war."' 2
Such a consistent use of political terms is more than a mere metaphor; it
is a recognition of an underlying reality.
Not every delegation of political power is a delegation of sovereign pow-
er, however. That is an important distinction, because the international
community is still premised on the supremacy of the sovereign powers of
the individual nation-states. The dividing line is that no state delegates
sovereigns power when it issues a charter of permissive action, (a) to a
specified collective group, (b) for limited purposes, (c) for a limited time,
(d) under safeguards based upon a careful survey, (e) with unlimited op-
portunity for observation of the group, (f) with a continuing right of su-
pervision, and (g) with an ultimate right of revocation. In this country,
such safeguards characterized ordinary corporate charters, which were
originally issued by state legislatures, even after the middle of the nine-
teenth century. Even now some South American governments still cling
jealously to the right to grant individual corporate charters.' 3
Sovereignty is ultimate power, and controlled delegations of authority
cannot impair it. Accordingly, corporations do not necessarily dilute the
sovereignty of the national state simply by being permitted to perform the
broad functions. What broader powers could a corporation have than to
handle a nation's credit or its transportation, or to develop vast untapped
lands and natural resources? Yet these were established corporate func-
tions when the nationalist state and the doctrine of national sovereignty
were in their hey-day. The corporation did not wrest sovereignty from the
state until the state, either through lassitude or preoccupation with other
0 judge Rifkind, in United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 526 (S.D. N.Y.,
1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947). See also United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F.
Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio, 1949).
1 United States v. U.S. Alkali Export Ass'n (S.D. N.Y.) unreported opinion, decided by
Judge Leibell, July 16, 1946.
32 United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. N.Y., 1951).
1 See Eder, Some Restrictions Abroad Affecting Corporations, 11 Law & Contemp. Prob.
712, 714 (1946); Bonsal and Borges, Limitations Abroad on Enterprise and Property Acquisi-
tion, 11 Law & Contemp. Prob. 720 (1946).
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matters (perhaps some would like to call it a process of constitutional de-
velopment), endowed it with new and more far-reaching attributes. These
new attributes were irrevocable immortality, a very large area of immuni-
ty from supervision by the state, and an indifference to (at times even a
conflict with) the general political objectives of the state. This new type
of corporation, mechanically spawned and sponsored with a sublime in-
difference as to objective and ignorance as to results, cannot serve as a
basis for international action, which is an area where national wishes
must continuously be consulted. The older type of individually conceived
and nurtured corporation, on the other hand, is consistent with national
sovereignty, and yet, on its procedural side, it requires only the formality
of incorporation by joint agreement.
Thus, two propositions are clear-the corporate form of transacting busi-
ness need involve no waiver of national sovereignty, and may embrace ac-
tivities that can properly be characterized as political. Let us now ap-
praise the political potentialities of the international business corporation
by a sidelong glance at some of their more recent activities. Thus, for ex-
ample, some international combines, like I.G. Farben and the big German
banks, have been dramatized as spearheads of the economic penetration
of foreign countries and as precursors of military aggression.14 Others, like
the Herman Goering Works and other German steel combines, have been
both the consolidators and the beneficiaries of military aggressions. 15 Still
others function as devices for the international division and exploitation
of resources-witness the nationally scattered stockholdings of Royal
Dutch Shell, Anglo-American Oil Company, and International Nickel.
Organized on a broader and more governmental plane, and functioning as
the economic janissaries of political alliance, are such entities as the vari-
ous development corporations which this country has sponsored in Latin
America, and the joint corporations organized by Soviet Russia with
Rumania and Hungary.' 6 Corporations have also been created for the pur-
pose of dividing business opportunities and markets abroad, such as the
jointly owned subsidiaries of du Pont and Imperial Chemical Industries
in Canada, Argentina, and Brazil.' 7 Similarly, they may serve to funnel
14 7 & 10 Hearings before Senate Subcommittee on Military Affairs, 79th Cong. 1st Sess.
(1945).
15 Edwards, Economic and Political Aspects of International Cartels (1944).
16See Timberg, Corporate Fictions: Logical, Social and International Implications, 46
Col. L. Rev. 533, 555-57 (1946).




in and channel out, on a joint basis, research and technology, as witness
the corporate offspring of Standard Oil and I.G. Farben.'5
Consider also the broad tapestry of economic activities that have been
brought under unified international dominion-coal, iron and steel em-
pires, with all their resultant artifacts and attendant shipping; fats and
oils, from the peanut oil of West Africa to the whale fisheries off Spitz-
bergen; chemicals, a single branch of which starts off with the lowly coal
tar and burgeons into all the dyestuffs on and off the rainbow; the chemi-
cally affiliated empires of oil, tying the liquid resources and the prosperity
of Venezuela and Saudi Arabia with road transport in New York and Lon-
don, and rubber, performing a similar service for Java and the Philippines.
Or reflect on the industrial puissance that has made of Singer, Ford,
Kodak, and Coca Cola, international descriptive nouns rather than mere
commercial names. Confronted with the most challenging and intricate
problems of the production, technology, and distribution of industrial
commodities, commercial man has devised elaborate and efficient inter-
national frameworks of organization. What is lacking on the political
side? Why has political man failed?
Political man has been in the custody of a jealous and insecure national
state, which, though it has voluntarily delegated religious and economic
authority to subsidiary and continuously operating mechanisms, still
hinges its international destinies on the intermittent diplomacy of the
Foreign Office and the thousand year old institution of the embassy or
legation. International economic organization, as a calculated endeavor on
the part of the national states, is still an incipient affair, limited to such
activities as the International Postal Union, the international control of
radio wave-lengths, a slim secretariat coping with such problems as nar-
cotics, white slavery, freedom of transit, double taxation, international
copyright-but always from the outside looking in. 9 Perhaps the special-*
ized agencies of the United Nations will in time broaden this tradition.
However, in the absence of a less diplomatic and gingerly approach, those
agencies, like the League of Nations agencies that preceded them, bid fair
to suffer from a plethora of broad principles and a deficit of specific busi-
ness. Decision-making in those agencies must be transferred from the
18 6 Hearings before Senate Committee on Patents, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. (1942).
19 The broadest general surveys of what has been accomplished along these lines thus far
are to be found in Symposium on World Organization, 55 Yale LJ. 865 (1946). See also Tim-
berg, An International Trade Tribunal-A Step Forward Short of Surrender of Sovereignty,
33 Geo. L.J. 373, 377-81, 398-99 (1945), for developments in the specific area of international
trade and commerce. Institute on World Organization, World Organization, a Balance Sheet
of the First Great Experiment (1942).
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outer and slowly revolving periphery of diverse national delegations to the
inner and more decisive core of a unified international secretariat.
The international business corporation, unlike the international politi-
cal agency, does not suffer from lack of activity; but however inclusive the
corporation's control over its own members and its particular segment of
the international economy it cannot single-handed accomplish its own in-
tegration with other segments of that economy, which are still organized
on nationalist lines. Furthermore, the goal of economic security it holds
out for its relatively few members is only a fractional answer to the po-
litical security that is the goal of organized human society. But the cor-
porate frame of organization supplies a mechanism for getting things
done, and this is what international society needs.
Let us distinguish the corporate mechanism for the transaction of inter-
national business by a group of private persons from that same mechanism
as applied to the conduct of joint governmental operations, by calling the
latter an "international govcorp." The question then suggests itself:
Where, in the tangled maze of international affairs, would international
govcorps make their most effective contribution? In the writer's mind, the
most fertile field for the operation of international govcorps are those eco-
nomic activities which are basic to the prosperity of two or more national
communities and which are already subject to some measure of regulation
or control by those communities. Characteristically, though, the control
exercised by the individual national community is hobbled, and sometimes
completely nullified, by territorial boundaries and by the conflicting poli-
cies of neighboring sovereigns. Those economic activities, to attain their
fullest development and promise, desperately require an underlying uni-
formity of approach and some measure of administrative coordination
which can be achieved, without at the same time producing an undesirable
inflexibility of operation, by the discriminating use of international gov-
corps.
Concretely, the international govcorp could, for example, take over the
direction of programs for the irrigation, navigation control, and hydro-
electric development of international river basins, along the lines of our
own Tennessee Valley Authority. Enterprises of this type have already
been suggested for the Danube and the Jordan.2 1 In fact international law
precedents have been operative for a century in the form of commission
regulation of the navigation, commerce and hydroelectric development of
20 Lowdermilk, Palestine, Land of Promise 171 et seq., 196 et seq., 201, 220, 222 et seq.,
230 et seq. (2d ed., 1949); Basch, A Price for Peace 116-18 (1945); Lorwin, Postwar Plans of
the United Nations 150 (1943).
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various so-called "international" or "common" waterways.2' "Experience
has shown that special river commissions, each with its powers and duties
laid down in an appropriate convention, are a more suitable method of
regulating the use of rivers than a general law of rivers could ever be.''2
There is quite a gap, of course, between the operation of the type of inter-
national commission that has been regulating navigation along the Rhine
or Danube, and an international govcorp charged with the development
of an entire region. Nevertheless these international river bodies illustrate
the close interdependence between effective international organization
and a sound functional operating base.
A well-conceived and properly implemented international river basin
authority would be more than a happenstance globalization of our domes-
tic TVA concept. It would be more than a way of establishing the new
planner's paradise. It would reflect the statesmanlike concept that people
who are working together on functional problems of the highest signifi-
cance, and on functional regional lines which must necessarily transcend
national boundaries, will tend to become immune from sterile national
passions and conflicts.
Adoption of the corporate mechanism would infuse, in an area where
continuity and harmony of policy are necessary, cooperative procedures
of international scope. If enough phases of international economic activity
can thus be made the object of dispassionate technical administration and
overriding international economic direction, less room would be left for the
boundary disputes and ethnic antagonisms that still lie at the root of so
much international strife.
The exigencies of conducting World War II produced a unified and co-
operating top military command, which issued basic directives and dele-
gated authority down the line without regard to the nationality of the in-
dividuals who either laid down or executed the delegations. Supplement-
ing the military decisions, were civilian administrative decisions involving
stupendous and delicate assignments and allocations of raw materials,
shipping, and industrial resources. Such decisions were not, and could not
be, made in the style of conventional diplomacy, one Foreign Office lan-
guidly negotiating a treaty with another. The precariousness of the cur-
21 The best known of the international rivers thus subject to control by international com-
mission are the Rhine, Elbe, Danube, Rio Grande and Colorado, but many lesser rivers and
lakes are similarly regulated. It may be noted incidentally in this connection that, while the
Suez Canal is nominally an Egyptian joint stock company, there was little doubt, at least until
recently, as to its international nature, dominated as it was by the English, French and Egyp-
tians. See Wilson, The Suez Canal (2d ed., 1939).
" Brierly, The Outlook for International Law (1944).
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rent peace has left the Western Allies with a good deal of this ad hoc,
shirt-sleeve collaboration on a direct military basis. Does not that same
precariousness press upon Western Europe the drastic need for collective
economic-political action along efficient and administrative lines, and the
scrapping of the outmoded diplomatic process? In fact, is not the Schuman
plan for a unified Ruhr iron and steel economy a belated recognition of
that need?
The Council of Europe is, of course, the most advanced current symbol
of the need and desire for the political and economic integration of West-
ern Europe. On August 26, 1950, its Consultative Assembly addressed a
Recommendation to the Committee of (European) Ministers, in which it
expresses the view that the development of insufficiently utilized resources and other
activities of the nature of European public utilities might be carried out through
agencies or companies established by the Member States in common, jointly financed
by them with or without the aid of private capital, and given concessions and regula-
tions by the said states in common.23
The Recommendation for the formation of such intra-European govcorps
stemmed from a report made by its Committee on Economic Questions,
which suggested as appropriate subject matters for such govcorps the fol-
lowing: (1) The hydro-electric development of the Alps. (2) The expansion
of colonial production, particularly in Africa. (3) The production of syn-
thetic gasoline, the refining of crude oil, and the distribution of oil and
gasoline. (4) A European Bank for Investments. (5) Aviation transport.
(6) The securing, for newly tapped sources of production, of a guaranteed
market, along the lines of buffer stock agencies known to students of inter-
national commodity agreements. (7) The provision of technical assist-
ance.
24
It would appear that the Council of Europe, while not abandoning its
efforts to accomplish the all-out political integration of Western Europe,
is focussing on the more tangible and readily digestible projects of setting
up functional corporate organisms to do functional jobs. All the suggested
activities were already in one way or another the subject of national and
international planning and action; what is significant is the suggestion of
the new govcorp form, and the implicit dissatisfaction with the prior more
diffuse, more feeble, and less governmentally responsive forms of organiza-
tional cooperation.
Thus, there have already been both private holding companies, such as
23 Council of Europe, Consultative Assembly, Document 106, Ordinary Sess. (1950).




Sofina, controlling electric utility enterprises in many different countries,
and numerous intergovernmental compacts governing the administration
of the hydroelectric resources of common rivers. England has had its fiasco
of an African "ground nuts" program, a disastrous legacy to a socialist
government from the Unilever combine. The international petroleum
trade is the domain of a few tremendous private industrial combines, held
together by a private concordat that is already the subject of criticism by
the consumers of oil.2 In the field of new investment, there have been the
activities of strong private banking groups, such as the French Banque de
l'Indo-Chine (in Indo-China) and Banque Europ~enne de Pays-Bas (in
Africa); the International Bank is, of course, already organized along cor-
porate administrative lines. International air transport is, in almost every
country of the world, either a governmental or a private monopoly: the
Scandinavian governments have formed a single company for the opera-
tion of airlines traversing their territories; there are international conven-
tions and protocols which govern air transport operations; and even in
these United States there has been proposed the idea of a single consoli-
dated international airline carrier, or "flag line."26 Buffer stock plans have
been established, and have broken down, for coffee, rubber, tin, etc., and
the commercial aspects of this country's stockpiling of critical and strate-
gic materials from abroad have been entrusted to government corpora-
tions. Finally, this nation's Point IV program has attempted to broaden
pre-existing private business efforts to help the Western European and
other non-Soviet countries bolster their production resources by sparking
their technological potential.
The basic reasons that have led these economic wise men of Europe to
suggest that these private, uni-national, and diplomatic activities be as-
signed to the tighter-knit administration of an international govcorp are
threefold. First, Europe's increasing awareness of the limitations of its re-
sources (and the consequent necessity for making efficient and economical
use thereof) has strengthened the drive for a more compulsive form of in-
ternational cooperation. A second consideration is the need for developing
some instrument for international capital or technological investment that
will give the investing country some assurance against unnecessary invest-
ment risks, and the country where the investment is made the requisite
degree of social control over the joint enterprise-and what more natural
"The Oil Business, Report with Recommendations made by the Oil Administration
(1945), published by Ivar Haeggstrom Printing Co. (Stockholm, 1947).
26 Sen. 197 & 987, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. (1947); Sen. 7, 82d Cong. lst Sess. (1951); H.R. 1,698;
1,699; 2,827; 2,828; 2,829; 2,830, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. (1947).
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than to adopt the corporate form that had been used for decades by pri-
vate companies to accomplish similar purposes? And finally, there is a
consideration not to be overlooked in the fear-beset world of Western
Europe-the fear that such a phenomenon as the reactivation of the Ruhr
coal and steel industry will place a perilous industrial (and hence military)
potential in the hands of a single (and historically too warlike) nation. It
was, in a sense, to bring about a joint military and political control of the
industrial potential underlying German rearmament, without pauperizing
Europe by depriving it of the valid economic contribution of German in-
dustry, that the Schuman Plan was devised.
2 1
The international govcorp need not, of course, take the precise shape
of a business corporation as the business man or lawyer now knows it.
What goes by the verbal tag of "authority" will satisfy the need for effi-
ciency and dispatch quite as well. Furthermore, the secretariat of an in-
ternational govcorp must be politically adroit and responsive to the un-
expressed limits of tolerance of their respective national constituencies.
They cannot be allowed to become infatuated with their own blueprints,
bemused with their own competence, or satisfied that technical proficiency
is their sole warrant for applause or survival. Like Antaeus, an interna-
tional govcorp will lose its strength when it leaves the ground of political
realism. At the same time, it may lose all its social meaning if it becomes
too solidly mired in the sticky mud of existing conventional political
habits of thought.
The international govcorp will thus doubtless develop characteristics
that will differentiate it from the ordinary business corporation. What it
will still have in common with such a conventional corporation, however,
is efficiency, expeditious mechanisms for airing and reconciling conflicts,
and a dearly delineated delegation of authority. Its activity will differ
from that of the international diplomatic conference, convention, or com-
mittee, in the following respects:
First, the international govcorp will be oriented to the functional ad-
ministration of a collective enterprise, in which nations will participate on
a cooperative rather than an individualistic basis. The focus of the usual
international committee or conference is on the anarchic process of dip-
lomatically negotiating differences among the nations as to how each na-
tion will carry out its individual segment of responsibility for what should
be a collective enterprise.
Second, the defining of the frame of reference of an international gov-
corp will be an automatic delegation to its staff of authority to carry out
27 Discussed at p. 751 infra.
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the agreed-on purposes of the govcorp. The diplomatic techniques of con-
ference, written convention, and committee result at best in blurred half-
delegations to a nation's negotiators, with the necessity for a reference
back every time a rival negotiating team initiates a new gambit.
Third, the functions, powers and standards of action of an international
govcorp will tend to be concrete and definite, without sacrificing needed
flexibility of operation. The corresponding functions, powers, and admin-
istrative standards of a diplomatic agreement are necessarily vague and
lacking in specificity.
Fourth, the international govcorp will develop plans on an open, em-
pirical, and international basis. Customary diplomatic techniques involve
the presentation of preconceived plans, developed in isolation on an
a priori, generalized, and rational plane, and enshrouded in the type of
secrecy that is inimical to intelligent public comprehension of underlying
issues.
Fifth, the conversational technique of the international govcorp is that
of the business office-frank, round-the-table discussions. Contrasted to
it is the cumbersome technique of the Foreign Office-the interminable
and constipated exchange of d~marches and pourparlers, drafts and re-
drafts.
Sixth, the international govcorp will be staffed by an internationally-
minded administrative and technical corps. However broad-gauged the
international education of Foreign Office officials and however noble their
intentions, they carry with them inescapable national and political fetters.
Seventh, the action taken by an international govcorp will be a common
decision, based on a proper focusing and funneling of the needed informa-
tion, policy-making responsibilities, and operational authority. What the
international conference approach generates is a welter of national stresses
and strains, each based on an improvised and poorly integrated admixture
of factual data, general blueprints and principles, and immediate political
decisions. Sometimes, this welter emerges in a cloudy compromise, some-
times not.
Let us examine these seven administrative advantages of corporate ac-
tion over diplomatic action in the light of that recently established inter-
national govcorp, the European Coal and Steel Community, otherwise
known as the Schuman Plan.
First, what is the collective enterprise? It is the coal and steel industry
of six countries, France, West Germany, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg,
and Italy. Hitherto conducted under the separate auspices of six national
governments and hence involving an uneasy interdependence among six
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autonomous markets, this industry, by a stroke of international creative-
ness, attains an integrated "common market" and a measurable degree of
international political control. 28
Second, the general purposes of the Plan are defined in Articles 2 and
3 of the Treaty.2 9
Third, are the plans of this Community specific and concrete? It would
seem sufficient here to note the great detail with which are spelt out such
functions of the High Authority of the Community within the common
market as the approval of new capital investment programs and assistance
in their financing (Art. 54); the encouragement of technical and economic
research (Art. 55); the attempt to deal with the effects, particularly as
they concern employment, of technological innovation and capital expan-
sion (Art. 56); the allocation, "in a period of manifest crisis,'" of produc-
28 The High Authority which manages the affairs of the Community has been referred to
as a supra-national agency. This, of course, is a highly significant distinction, for it means that
High Authority can make decisions which must be obeyed by the national states. While the
provisions of the organic treaty of the Community justify this characterization of the High
Authority as supra-national, doubt has been expressed as to whether "vital interests" of
the contracting nations will in actual operation be subordinated to the decisions of the High
Authority. See note 39 infra.
21 "Article 2: The mission of the European Coal and Steel Community is to contribute to
economic expansion, the development of employment and the improvement of the standard of
living in the participating countries through the institution, in harmony with the general econo-
my of the member States, of a common market as defined in Article 4.
"Community must progressively establish conditions which will in themselves assure the
most rational distribution of production at the highest possible level of productivity, while
avoiding the creating of fundamental and persistent disturbances in the economies of the
member States.
"Article 3: Within the framework of their respective powers and responsibilities and in the
common interest, the institutions of the Community shall:I (a) See that the common market is regularly supplied, taking account of the needs of third
countries;
(b) Assure to all consumers in comparable positions within the single market equal access
to the sources of production;
(c) Seek the establishment of the lowest prices which are possible without requiring any
corresponding rise either in the prices charged by the same enterprises in other transactions or
in the price-level as a whole in another period, while at the same time permitting necessary
amortization and providing normal possibilities of remuneration for capital invested;
(d) See that conditions are maintained which will encourage enterprises to expand and
improve their ability to produce and to promote a policy of rational development of natural
resources, avoiding inconsiderate exhaustion of such resources;
(e) Promote the improvement of the living and working conditions of the labor force in
each of the industries under its jurisdiction so as to make possible the equalization of such
conditions in an upward direction;
(f) Further the development of international trade and see that equitable limits are ob-
served in prices charged on external markets;
(g) Promote the regular expansion and the modernization of production as well as the
improvement of its quality under conditions which preclude any protection against competing




tion quotas and coal and steel resources (Arts. 58, 59); the prohibition of
unfair competitive practices (particularly "price reductions whose pur-
pose is to acquire a monopoly position within the common market") and
of discriminatory prices and practices (particularly those based on the na-
tionality of the buyer) (Arts. 60, 63); the fixing of maximum and (where
"a manifest crisis exists or is imminent") minimum prices (Art. 61); and
the forbidding of agreements to fix or influence prices, restrict or control
production, technical development or investments, or allocate markets,
products, customers or sources of supply (Art. 65). With respect to merg-
ers, corporate acquisitions and other concentrations of business enterprise,
the High Authority must pass on all such concentrations, authorize only
such concentrations as do not impair the maintenance of effective compe-
tition or evade the rule of competition, and split up illegal concentrations
(Art. 66). The foregoing are direct responsibilities of this new industrial
Community. In addition, there are other duties of this govcorp where the
emphasis is to stimulate appropriate national action, in such areas as
wages and the movement of labor (Arts. 63, 64), transport (Art. 65), and
customs duties (Art. 67).
Fourth, the public and open nature of the Community's operations
seems to be insured by two main types of provisions. One is a direct and
unequivocal emphasis on publicity (see Art. 5). The other is the rather
elaborate system of checks and reviews to which the High Authority, the
operating core of the enterprise, is subjected, i.e, the operations of the
Consultative Committee, consisting of an equal number of producer,
worker, and consumer representatives (Arts. 18, 19); the power of the
General Assembly (representing the peoples of the member States) to re-
view the report of the High Authority and bring about the High Authori-
ty's removal by passing a motion of censure (Art. 24); the necessity of
consulting with the Council, the diplomatic representatives of the member
States (Art. 26), which has the power to fix the salaries of the High
Authority (Art. 29); and the review jurisdiction of the Court over viola-
tions of the Treaty and abuses of power or authority (Art. 33).
The Council acts as a buffer, either by way of consultation or as a body
whose concurrence is required, on matters that require harmonizing the
actions of member governments, such as the member government's guar-
antee on loans obtained by enterprises (Art. 51), the institution of finan-
cial mechanisms to carry out the objectives of the Community (Art. 53),
the financing of programs for the re-employment of displaced workers
(Art. 56), the setting up of production quotas (Art. 58), restrictions on ex-
ports to third countries (Art. 59, Sec. 5), the fixing of maximum or mini-
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mum prices (Art. 61), and recommendations to States to counteract spe-
cial advantages given to, or burdens placed on, coal or steel enterprises
within their borders (Art. 67). Of special interest is the one situation in
which the Council wields direct executive authority (with the High
Authority having only proposal-making and consultative functions)-the
establishing of consumption priorities and the allocation of coal and steel
among the Community's industries (Art. 59). The relegation of the High
Authority to a secondary role in connection with this function probably
stems from a fear that, being so intimately focussed on the coal and steel
industry, it might tend to favor coal and steel enterprises as against other
industries that also need coal and steel, e.g., power. The Consultative
Committee similarly acts as a buffer, usually along with the Council (Arts.
53, 55, 58, 59, 62, 67) where the favorable opinion of worker, technical and
consumer groups plays an important part in assuring the success of the
High Authority's operations. It is particularly and uniquely concerned
with (1) action where the standard of living of workers drops (Art. 68),
and (2) the choice of "abnormal base points" for price quotations (Art.
60). It might conceivably be contended that this set of reviews and con-
trols by the diplomatic, democratic, economic, advisory, and judicial or-
gans of the Community indicate an over-wieldy organization, but they
clearly seem to be sanctions against the development of visionary, imprac-
tical or secretive programs of action.
Fifth, the greater informality of the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity over conventional diplomatic bodies is implicit throughout its set-up.
In addition, note the ample provision made in the Treaty for the issuing
of opinions and recommendations (Art. 14), and the High Authority's
power to institute what are quite non-ornamentally labeled economic
study groups (Art. 16).
The sixth administrative consideration, the composition of the interna-
tional se6retariat, may well be the most vital ingredient of effective inter-
national cooperation. Here it should be noted that the High Authority of
the Community, which is charged with the execution of the wealth of
functions already described, is to be chosen on the basis of the cardinal
considerations of general competence and independence of connection
with the industry (Art. 9). Also, it is provided that the Court cannot re-
view the conclusions of the High Authority which are based on economic
facts (Art. 33).
Seventh and last, we come to the end result of all this administrative
machinery, the making of informed and effective decisions. This is a result
that no amount of forceful treaty language or detailed organizational pro-
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cedures can guarantee. However, the Treaty empowers the High Authori-
ty, the trained secretariat or executive management committee of the
Community, to make binding decisions (Arts. 14 and 15). The publication
of opinions and recommendations already alluded to, while on the surface
informal and noncommittal, may in certain circumstances have a genuine-
ly compulsive impact.3°
It is not intended by the foregoing to convey an enthusiastic and un-
qualified approval of the Schuman Plan. For one thing, it is important not
to take the word for the deed. Subsequent operating experience may com-
pletely frustrate what is, thus far, a thoroughgoing expression of ambi-
tious international ideals. The lack of a cooperative spirit in the future may
defeat the achievement of that climate of cooperation that pervades the
letter and the surface of the treaty document.3 ' Furthermore, doubt has
been expressed as to whether the Schuman Plan "would be more than a
governmental fagade for an old fashioned cartel."32 Anxiety has been felt
that certain allegedly temporary expedients, such as price-fixing and spe-
cial reconversion funds, designed to facilitate an easier transition to the
Europe-wide common market, may turn out to be a permanent (and car-
telized) state of affairs. Then, will the French close some of their coal pits,
with possible dire unemployment problems, if competitive forces demon-
strate that their continued operation is uneconomic? Will the German
steel industry keep down production and sacrifice immediate profits, if
that be the competitive verdict?33
There is possible occasion for other basic criticisms of the philosophy
of the entire project, e.g., that it gives undue prominence to the factor of
regulation (as contrasted with our own competitive system) or that it does
not have sufficient safeguards against control by engineer bureaucrats or
financial oligarchs.3 4 The only point relevant to this paper is that six coun-
tries have come to grips with a gargantuan economic problem that they
had in the past unsuccessfully sought to cope with by other means, and
30 On publicity as a legal sanction, see Timberg, op. cit. supra note 19, at 390-91.
"3 While an impressive juridical panoply has been built up by international convention for
the institutions and functionaries of the European Coal and Steel Community, it still remains
to be seen how its operations will in practice be geared in to the policies of national sovereign
striving to exert a more local, but nevertheless pertinacious, jurisdiction over coal and steel
enterprises.
32 158 The Economist 1105, 1107 (1950).
33 Diebold, Imponderables of the Schuman Scheme, 29 Foreign Affairs 114 (1950).
34 A defender of the Schuman Plan would perhaps attempt to remind us that our bitumi-
nous coal industry has been the subject of extensive regulation by administrative commissions
and that despair at eliminating elements of rigidity in the production policies and price struc-
ture of the steel industry has brought forth suggestions for governmental administrative
control.
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that they have contrived an organizational framework that has some
promise of effective (if not necessarily the correct) resolution of that
problem.
To those who believe in the ultimate necessity of an all-inclusive inter-
national government, there may be something distasteful about the limit-
ed coverage of any one international govcorp, such as the European Coal
and Steel Community. There may be a disagreeable lack of symmetry in
the probable haphazard proliferation of such govcorps. To the writer, how-
ever, this limited coverage has certain very practical advantages, and is
consistent with the rule of law in the international community.
In a more principled and less empirical stage of my own intellectual
development, I remember being somewhat taken aback by the last few
pages of Sir Henry Sumner Maine's lucid Lectures on International Law.
The bulk of this very readable volume was taken up with a statement of
the principles and historical development of international law, particular-
ly the law of belligerency. In his last chapter, Sir Henry turned to the
topic of proposals to abate war. After reviewing other proposals and
precedents, Maine concluded that the old-fashioned entente of leading
powers was the best system for keeping the peace. For him, the most effec-
tive historical precedent along these lines had been an informal amicable
understanding that had prevailed for ten years among three Emperors-
those of Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary.
Now, what is so defective about this so simple solution? It is this: Peace
depends on relationships among men, not among governments and their
titular heads. "Government" and "emperor" are symbols upon whom, as
the focal point of their country's foreign relations, converge and through
whom are discharged the outgoing pressures and passions of their respec-
tive human components. Governments differ in their potentialities for
maintaining peace. That difference is a function largely of whether a
monolithic or a pluralistic state is involved, i.e., whether the national
government tenaciously clings to control of all the concerns of its citizens,
or whether it is prepared to make wise delegations of authority to groups
within its borders.
Take, for example, the historical role of England and Germany. As a
practical matter, England was a pluralistic state, which had worked out a
marked degree of autonomy and responsibility for individuals, for incor-
porated and unincorporated groups, and even for different segments of its
government. Germany, as Thorstein Veblen pointed out,'was an absolu-
tistic state two generations removed from feudalism.15 England, in the
31 Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (1939).
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sneering language of German imperialists, Karl Marx, and Werner Som-
bart, was a race of craven and utilitarian shopkeepers, devoted to selfish
commercial gain, muddling along with specific enterprises and transac-
tions-and hence addicted to the ways of peace. Germany, on the other
hand, in the minds of some of its apologists, was a country of heroic, un-
selfish, and logical idealists, devoted to grand and heroic conceptions, un-
ambiguously dedicated to national honor and glorification-and hence
born warriors.3 6
A pluralistic state (England) tends to make for peace, and a totalitarian
state (prewar Germany) for war. Why? Perhaps an analogy may clarify.
The external attitudes and relations of a pluralistic state are like an elec-
tric transmission grid with many parallel wires and many circuit inter-
rupters and disconnecting switches; those of a totalitarian state are like
a system with but a single wire and almost no facilities for stepping down
voltages. Voltages which can be comfortably carried by the pluralist sys-
tem would, in the case of the totalitarian one, cause breakdowns and elec-
trocution of maintenance men. In short, a country needs as many men as
possible, not one man, in positions of control of its international affairs.
And it needs men with specific competence for specific subject matters,
not merely people with a general flair for negotiation. If political plural-
ism, i.e., theldelegation of specific subject matters of common social con-
cern to specially constituted and qualified groups, makes for order, pros-
perity, and harmony within national states, why should it not do so
among those states? If decentralization, i.e., the delegation of specific
tasks to the men and industrial units best suited for them, is a necessity
for the modern large industrial corporation, may it not also be a crying
need of the modern society of nations? So, let us not be afraid of limited
coverage for our international govcorps; let us rather fear our human in-
ability to cope with even that limited coverage.
The international govcorp is not going to fragmentize or otherwise
jeopardi7e the rule of international law and order, viewed as a pragmatic
reality and not as a set of universal verbal prescriptions. Law's chief sagac-
ity lies in its self-denying nature and the scope and comity it accords to
custom, usage, and accepted mores. A society's lawfulness is in inverse
proportion to the number of its laws, and the frequency with which its
citizens go to court. Therefore, if the international community has mech-
anisms which can prevent violence and mitigate international tensions,
international law prevails. And the international community can mitigate
6See Armstrong, Thus Speaks Germany 153-56, 159-60, 163-64, 171 (1941); Dewey,
German Philosophy and Politics 57 (1915); Sombart, Handler und Helden (1915).
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tensions, and avert violence, by providing forums for the discussion and
release of such tensions. Preferably, these should be separate forums
wherein individual causes of tensions can be aired and worked out.
Thus, the limited coverage of an international govcorp is an advan-
tageous matter for international development and the removal of inter-
national friction. Also, a limited charter of activities would serve to satis-
fy the national states that might be jealous of any broader grant, because
such a limitation would conserve for the national state its true sovereign-
ty. It has already been noted that such a limitation helped satisfy national
states at a time when they were most sensitive to the encroachments of
the private business corporation. 7
Let us be, therefore, not logical absolutists, but philosophical positivists
in the field of international institutions. Rather than wait for the realiza-
tion of currently unattainable ideals of an international legislature, execu-
tive, or judiciary, let us focus on institutions less removed from the day-
to-day activities of men. Let us remember that the pax Romana of classi-
cal times and the pax Britannica of the nineteenth century were periods,
not of grand, unifying juridical ideologies, but of intensified commercial
activity accompanied by enough law to settle such commercial disputes as
arose. Viewed in such a modest yet not unambitious perspective, interna-
tional govcorps-if their status and activities can but be geared with those
of the existing political sovereigns, the national states3 3-will not retard,
but rather promote, the ultimate development of world order, limited
though they may be to selected enclaves of international activity.3 9
3" See p. 742 supra.
38 See Timberg, International Combines and National Sovereigns: A Study in Conflict of
Laws and Mechanisms, 85 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 575, 609 (1947).
39 Disputes among individuals are the everyday concomitants of their international eco-
nomic activity. The resolution of those disputes is, therefore, an unobtrusive method of building
up international law without derogating from national sovereignty. Accordingly, the author
has staked greater hopes for peace among nations on an international trade tribunal, to handle
the disputes of individuals, than on a High Court of Justice, to handle disputes among nations.
See Timberg, An International Trade Tribunal, 33 Geo. L. J. 373 (1945).
